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Editorial
Dear Reasoners,
Welcome to the last issue of the Year. Many of our daily
activities are being disrupted by the continuing pandemic, and
The Reasoner is no exception. Since its first number in 2007
this gazzette has been published on a monthly basis. However
its prospects are, as many things at the moment, highly uncer-
tain. Hence we decided to switch to bimonthly issues, hoping
that brighter days will allow us to switch back soon.
As usual, let me remind you of the many ways you can
contribute to The Reasoner. You can serve as a Guest Ed-
itor, typically by interviewing a person you think is provid-
ing an interesting contribution to the wider field of reasoning.
You could submit to The Reasoner
Speculates section, as done this
month by Lina Lissia. If you’re
running a project, you may con-
sider reaching the broad audience
of Reasoners by contributing to the
Dissemination Corner, as done in
this issue by Colin Jakob Rittberg.
Or, you could send us short sum-
maries of recent meetings, work-
shops or conferences. This is-
sue reports on two online events
that took place –online– in the late
summer. You could submit a pro-
posal for a regular column in the What’s Hot in . . . section –
perhaps the most recognisable feature of The Reasoner. And
of course you are welcome to send us items for the news
and listings section. Whichever your way of contributing
to the next issues of The Reasoner, a warm Thank You in
advance, on behalf of the, resisting, reasoning community!
Hykel Hosni
University of Milan
Features
The Reasoner Speculates
On some analogies between the counterexamples
to modus ponens (and modus tollens)
I believe that a single structure underlies the main (putative)
failures of modus ponens and modus tollens to be found in
the literature. I will not prove this point here; however, I
hope that my (unsystematic) remarks will be taken as hints
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of the existence of a single structure underlying the different
scenarios. That is, I hope my remarks will be taken as sug-
gesting that, in spite of the superficial differences, the four
scenarios below are all constructed in the same way. The
scenarios are the ones proposed by McGee (1985: A coun-
terexample to modus ponens, Journal of Philosophy, 462–471),
Yalcin (2012: A counterexample to modus tollens, Journal
of Philosophical Logic, 1001–1024), Kolodny and MacFar-
lane (2010: Ifs and oughts, Journal of Philosophy, 115–143),
and Carroll (1894: A logical paradox, Mind, 436–438) re-
spectively. If this conclusion were confirmed (i.e., if it were
indeed the case that these scenarios share the same struc-
ture), one important consequence would be that a unified treat-
ment of the different scenarios is what we should aim at.
(Before starting, a preliminary
clarification for non-specialists:
in the literature, the examples
below are not regarded as poten-
tial threats to modus ponens (or
modus tollens) for the material
conditional (i.e, “If P ⊃ Q, and P,
then Q”, or “If P ⊃ Q, and ¬Q,
then ¬P”), but rather to modus
ponens (or modus tollens) for the
non-material, natural-language
indicative conditional.)
The most famous scenario in the literature certainly is
McGee’s election scenario (1985: 462):
“Opinion polls taken just before the 1980 election
showed the Republican Ronald Reagan decisively
ahead of the Democrat Jimmy Carter, with the other
Republican in the race, John Anderson, a distant
third. Those apprised of the poll results believed,
with good reason:
[1] If a Republican wins the election, then if it’s not
Reagan who wins it will be Anderson.
[2] A Republican will win the election.
Yet they did not have reason to believe
[3] If it’s not Reagan who wins, it will be Anderson.”
So modus ponens seems to fail in (1)-(3). I will now show
that from each of the most prominent scenarios other than
McGee’s (namely, from Yalcin’s, Kolodny and MacFarlane’s,
and Carroll’s scenarios) it is possible to generate a McGee-like
argument. I will also show that a Yalcin-style example (see
below) can be provided starting from McGee’s story.
First of all, note that (1)-(3) can be transformed into what,
intuitively, seems to be a counterexample to modus tollens (see
Gauker (1994: Thinking out loud, Princeton University Press),
but also Kolodny and MacFarlane (2010: 115–143)):
(1) If a Republican wins the election, then if it’s not Reagan
who wins it will be Anderson.
(4) If it’s not Reagan who wins, it’s not the case that Anderson
will win.
(4) and the nested consequent of (1) seem to contradict
each other and therefore seem to imply, by modus tollens, that
(5) the winner won’t be a Republican. However, intuitively,
(5) does not follow from (1) and (4), as “a Republican will
win” seems perfectly acceptable if the winning Republican is
Reagan.
Now consider another alleged counterexample to modus
tollens, that is, Yalcin’s example (2012: 1001-1002):
“An urn contains 100 marbles: a mix of blue and red,
big and small. The breakdown:
blue red
big 10 30
small 50 10
A marble is selected at random and placed under
a cup. This is all the information given about the
situation. Against this background, the following
claims about the marble under the cup are licensed:
(P1) If the marble is big, then it’s likely red.
(P2) The marble is not likely red.
However, from these, the following conclusion does
not intuitively follow:
(C1) The marble is not big.”
However, according to Yalcin (2012: 1002), “[. . . ] this
conclusion would follow, were Modus Tollens [. . . ] valid”.
Now, it turns out that starting from Yalcin’s scenario we can
generate a McGee-style argument (namely a counterexample
to modus ponens involving a compound conditional):
(P3) If the marble is not red, then if it’s big, it’s blue.
(P4) The marble is not red.
(C2) If the marble is big, then it’s blue. (!)
In spite of the premises being intuitively acceptable,
the conclusion does not seem to follow. A modus tollens,
compound-conditional version of Yalcin’s argument can also
be generated:
(P3) If the marble is not red, then if it’s big, it’s blue.
(P5) If the marble is big, then it’s not blue.
(C3) The marble is red. (!)
Here too, modus tollens seems to fail.
Now let me present Kolodny and MacFarlane’s scenario
(2010: 115-116).
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“Ten miners are trapped either in shaft A or in shaft B,
but we do not know which. Flood waters threaten to
flood the shafts. We have enough sandbags to block
one shaft, but not both. If we block one shaft, all the
water will go into the other shaft, killing any miners
inside it. If we block neither shaft, both shafts will fill
halfway with water, and just one miner, the lowest in
the shaft, will be killed.
Action if miners in A if miners in B
Block shaft A All saved All drowned
Block shaft B All drowned All saved
Block neither shaft One drowned One drowned
We take it as obvious that the outcome of our
deliberation should be
[6] We ought to block neither shaft.
Still, in deliberating about what to do, it seems
natural to accept:
[7] If the miners are in shaft A, we ought to block
shaft A.
[8] If the miners are in shaft B, we ought to block
shaft B.
We also accept:
[9] Either the miners are in shaft A or they are in
shaft B.
But [7], [8], and [9] seem to entail
[10] Either we ought to block shaft A or we ought to
block shaft B.
And this is incompatible with [6]. So we have a para-
dox.”
Starting from Kolodny and MacFarlane’s story, I can
show that, once again, an argument involving an embedded
conditional can be generated:
(11) If we ought to block neither shaft, then if the miners are in
shaft A, we ought not to block shaft A.
(6) We ought to block neither shaft.
(12) If the miners are in shaft A, we ought not to block shaft A.
(!)
We intuitively accept both (11) and (6), but we do not accept
(12).
A modus tollens version can also be provided:
(11) If we ought to block neither shaft, then if the miners are in
shaft A, we ought not to block shaft A.
(7) If the miners are in shaft A, we ought to block shaft A.
(10*) We ought to block one of the shafts. (!)
Again, it seems rational to believe the two premises and to
disbelieve the conclusion.
Finally, consider Carroll’s scenario. In the late 19th century,
Lewis Carroll (1894: 436–438) proposed his well-known “bar-
bershop paradox”: Carr, Allen and Brown are three barbers
who never leave their shop at the same time, as they cannot
leave the shop unattended. Moreover, due to the consequences
of an illness, Allen never goes out without Brown. Given this
background, we accept both (13) and (14):
(13) If Carr is out, then if Allen is out, Brown is in.
(14) If Allen is out, then Brown is out.
Now, it seems that, by modus tollens, we should con-
clude (15) Carr is in. However, intuitively, we should reject
this conclusion, for it is perfectly possible that Carr is out,
provided that Allen is in. That is, modus tollens seems to
fail. We can also generate a modus ponens version of (13)-(15):
(13) If Carr is out, then if Allen is out, Brown is in.
(16) Carr is out.
(17) If Allen is out, Brown is in. (!)
Here again, we should accept the premises and reject the
conclusion.
So I have shown that no matter which scenario we start
from (whether McGee’s, Yalcin’s, Kolodny and MacFarlane’s,
or Carroll’s), we can always generate a compound-conditional,
McGee-style counterexample to both modus ponens and modus
tollens. This seems to suggest that a same structure hides be-
hind these four scenarios. To reinforce my point, let me add
that in McGee’s scenario it is possible to proceed the other
way around: we can go from an argument involving an embed-
ded conditional (i.e., McGee’s original argument) to a Yalcin-
style counterexample (to modus tollens), featuring no embed-
ded conditionals. Recall the election scenario. Both “If Reagan
doesn’t win, then Carter will probably win” and “Carter won’t
probably win” are sensible claims. However, at least if we stick
to Yalcin’s perspective, we should not be ready to accept the
unqualified conclusion that Reagan will win.
Lina Lissia
University of Turin
—————————————
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Dissemination Corner
Virtues and Vices in Mathematics
Mathematical knowledge-making is done by human agents and
human action invites ethical reflection. Mathematicians dis-
agree about who deserves recognition, promotion, power and
prizes; the social structure of mathematics is liable to ethical
concerns such as power abuse and injustices pertaining to race,
gender, and social status; and the products of mathematical ac-
tivity are not ethically neutral, such as the Black-Scholes for-
mula which impacted economic policy decisions. These ethi-
cal dimensions of mathematical knowledge-making shape the
who, the how, and the what of mathematical research activ-
ity and are hence a socially relevant aspect of the epistemol-
ogy of mathematics. These insights motivate the Virtues and
Vices in Mathematics (VaViM) project, for which Colin Jakob
Rittberg is funded by the European Commission via the Marie
Skłodowska-Curie Individual Fellowship scheme. The project
aims to develop a normative framework for the ethics of math-
ematical research activity which will be employed to suggest
concrete interventions at the individual and structural level,
such as explanations of the harm that some actions in math-
ematical knowledge-making can cause (individual) and rec-
ommend policy advice (structural). Thought about the ethics
of mathematics goes back to Plato, for whom mathematical
knowledge is ethical since mathematics, like ethics, studies
unity (according to him). His writing does not, however, pro-
vide a normative framework to engage with the ethics of math-
ematical research activity. Mathematical societies, such as the
American Mathematical Society or the European Mathemat-
ical Society, provide codes of conduct, but these tend to fo-
cus on issues of plagiarism and contain only few remarks on
social responsibility, such as respect for mathematical ability
regardless of gender. Some mathematicians are aware of the
limited scope of these codes of conduct and have called for fur-
ther debate. For example, mathematician and co-founder of the
Ethics in Mathematics (EiM) society in Cambridge, Maurice
Chiodo, has remarked how numerous mathematicians have told
him that they would publish algorithms for fast factorisations if
they would develop one, even though such algorithms would
be a threat to contemporary encryption methods, jeopardising
internet security and the global economy. The EiM focusses
on the ethical implications of such products of mathematical
knowledge-making rather than their production. Philosophers
of mathematics have started to investigate the production of
mathematical knowledge, but they mostly treat it as a phe-
nomenon to be described and treated as data rather than as a
human activity in need of critical ethical reflection. What is
needed, then, is a normative framework for an account of the
ethics of mathematical knowledge-making. We need concep-
tual tools to engage with the ethics of human activity in mathe-
matical knowledge production and a theoretical background to
support concrete recommendations for improvement, such as
policy advice. VaViM proposes a virtue-theoretic framework
to achieve this. For a practitioner to act virtuously is to act in
a way that is conducive to the aims of the practice in the con-
text of human life; rigour is a virtue of mathematical proving
practices because these practices aim at secure knowledge. As
such, the virtues generate normative force from careful descrip-
tions of actual goings-on in mathematical practices: virtue-
theoretic frameworks can bridge the normative/descriptive di-
vide. This makes virtue-theoretic accounts supple and thereby
capable of engaging with the heterogeneity of mathematical re-
search activity. For example, such accounts can explain why
rigorous proving often only happens after the creative process
in mathematical knowledge-making; rigour may not be an aim
of creative mathematical practices. VaViM draws on the virtue-
theoretic literature provided by the aretaic turn in disciplines
such as epistemology, ethics, argumentation theory, or politi-
cal theory and enriches relevant insights through detailed case
studies of mathematical practices. To highlight the impact and
social relevance of ethical considerations on the epistemology
of mathematics, the project focusses on epistemic injustices in
mathematical knowledge-making. Epistemic injustices are in-
justices that occur on an epistemic dimension. For example,
mathematician Olivia Caramello may have suffered such an in-
justice when the novelty of her work was judged based on un-
published knowledge accessible only to the leading researchers
in the field. Rittberg, C.J., Tanswell, F.S. & Van Bendegem,
J.P. (2020: Epistemic injustice in mathematics. Synthese 197,
3875–3904) is an indicative story that what mathematicians
call “folk-theorems”, i.e. often unpublished results that are
nonetheless well-known to and relied upon by parts of the com-
munity, can provide an unjust standard for judging the novelty
of a piece of mathematics. These matters impact both the epis-
temology of mathematics, because they shape what does and
does not get published, as well as the ethics of mathematical
knowledge-making, because they impact the career and life of
mathematicians. VaViM will employ an empirically informed
and case-study driven approach to develop a socially relevant
philosophy of mathematics. It is a declared aim of the project
to engage with mathematical and philosophical communities in
order to develop a virtue-theoretic framework for the ethics of
mathematics capable of supporting the project’s interventionist
stance.
The postdoctoral Marie Skłodowska-Curie Fellow of the
VaViM project is Colin Jakob Rittberg. The supervisor of
the project is Catarina Dutilh Novaes, who is currently lead-
ing an ERC Consolidator project on The Social Epistemol-
ogy of Argumentation. VaViM’s project website is https:
//vavimproject.wixsite.com/home.
Colin Jakob Rittberg
University of Amsterdam
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News
Bayesian Epistemology: Perspectives and Chal-
lenges, 10–14 August
The conference and Summer school “Bayesian Epistemology:
Perspectives and Challenges” was supposed to take place in
Munich, Germany. However, due to the current Covid-19 pan-
demic, the conference was moved online. The event was or-
ganised by Jürgen Landes, funding was provided by the Ger-
man Research Foundation (DFG) and also the Munich Center
for Mathematical Philosophy. Our goal was bringing together
scholars exploring applications, challenges and foundations of
Bayesian epistemology.
The summer school started with Gerhard Schurz (Düssel-
dorf) who presented metainduction as a possible response
to Hume’s problem of induction. Schurz demonstrated how
metainduction about object-level inductive methods makes a
non-circular a posteriori justification of objection-induction
possible. Over a series of two lectures in the summer school
and one talk at the conference metainduction was not only ap-
plied to the problem of induction, but also to probability aggre-
gation.
Anna Mahtani (London School of Economics) discussed the
philosophical problem of what exactly the objects of credence
are. In her two lectures at the summer school, she argued that
this problem is related to the question of what propositions
are. She then applied David Chalmers’ two-dimensionalism of
propositions to the objects of credences and highlighted some
unwelcome resulting implications. Anna also presented Frege’s
puzzle to the Ex Ante Pareto Principle in a talk at the confer-
ence.
In two lectures at the summer school, Leah Henderson
(Groningen) first introduced the theory of hierarchical Bayesian
modelling and subsequently demonstrated how the theory is
applicable to various problems in cognitive science and the
philosophy of science. Henderson then defended a view she
termed “emergent compatibalism” reconciling inference to the
best explanation and Bayesianism in her talk at the conference.
James Joyce focussed his two lectures at the summer school
and his talk at the conference on accuracy and evidence. Joyce
investigated the epistemic norms which relate evidence and the
accuracy of credences. For this aim, Joyce employed a multi-
tude of concepts, most notably the notion of an expert probabil-
ity (a probability to which an agent surrenders one’s own prob-
ability). He then attempted to extract epistemic norms from
accuracy norms using epistemic utility theory. His presentation
at the conference was devoted to an accuracy centered episte-
mology, which instead of taking the alethic prescription “Hold
accurate credences!” as fundamental, incorporates both alethic
and evidential norms.
In addition to the double lectures, the summer school also
featured two single lectures by Jürgen Landes and Naftali
Weinberger. Landes introduced the central notions of objective
Bayesianism and highlighted its advantages in comparison to
subjective Bayesianism. Weinberger presented graphical causal
models and discussed the bridge principles between causal hy-
potheses and probability distributions.
The conference itself included talks that showcased applica-
tions of Bayesian epistemology. Alicja Kowalewska and Rafal
Urbaniak (Gdansk) presented a measure of coherence that solve
a variety of problems discussed in the literature. Pavel Janda
(University of Gdansk) argued that a credence of 12 as a solu-
tion to the Sleeping Beauty problem is only valid if one of the
key assumptions of the problem is violated and therefore the
argument of the solution is invalid. Aviezer Tucker (Harvard)
outlined the problem of disinformation and how a genealogy
of information in media would help with identifying disinfor-
mation. David Kinney (Santa Fe) proposed that stacking indi-
viduals’ statistical models in order to aggregate credences in a
group of agents achieves more accurate results than averaging
credences. Mario Günter (Australian National University) pro-
vided an analysis of actual causation which captures more sce-
narios than any counterfactual account to date. Patrick Klösel
(LMU Munich) proposed how graphical causal modelling en-
riches the methodology of econometrics and how a specific
philosophy of methodology may contribute to the philosophy
of science as well. Rafal Urbaniak presented how imprecise
credences can increase accuracy with respect to claims about
expected frequencies. Patriyk Dziurosz-Serafinowicz (Gdansk)
raised the question whether it was ever rational to postpone a
decision in Bayesian decision theory in order to obtain some
uncertain future evidence. Michal Godziszewski (MCMP) ad-
dressed the question how considerations about fairness and jus-
tified representation can be implemented in judgement aggrega-
tion and belief merging. It is therefore apparent that the con-
ference hosted an abundance of applications of Bayesian epis-
temology.
Other speakers challenged certain aspects of Bayesian epis-
temology, however. Mario Günther and Borut Trpin (MCMP)
argued that learning from indicative conditionals fails in
Bayesian epistemology. Richard Lohse (Karlsruhe) defended
that the notion of accuracy cannot be characterised mathemat-
ically, which challenges the accuracy-first programme. An-
dree Weber (Mannheim) discussed how agents should react to
peer disagreement, as simple updating is not the right method.
Alex Meehan (Princeton) showed how Kolmogorov condition-
alisation is Dutch bookable and proposed the Kolmogorov-
Blackwell conditionalisation as a norm to update beliefs when
the prior probability of the evidence is assigned 0. Snow Zhang
(Princeton) presented and resolved a trilemma involving indi-
vidual deference, linear averaging and probable disagreement
given a Bayesian epistemology.
Finally, some speakers addressed issues about the founda-
tions of Bayesianism. Seamus Bradley (Leeds) proposed a
change in the updating rule for imprecise probabilities in order
to solve the problem of “belief inertia”. Miriam Bowen (Leeds)
criticised some accounts of what degrees of belief actually are
and proposed that comparative relations between beliefs are
fundamental and numerical representations can be explained by
the former. Sven Neth (Berkeley) presented that, given a non-
zero probability of an agent not updating in a Bayesian manner,
it may be rational to reject more (free) information.
From this exposition it ought to be apparent that Bayesian
epistemology offers a colourful mix of different research topics.
Despite that, the common framework enables the researchers to
cooperate and to draw inspiration from each other.
For more information visit the conference website
Andreas Lüchinger
Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy
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“If ifs and ands were pots and pans. . . ”: Quali-
tative and Quantitative Approaches to Reasoning
and Conditionals, 27-28 August
The virtual online workshop “If ifs and ands were pots and
pans. . . ”: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches to Rea-
soning and Conditionals (27.–28.08.2020) brought together re-
cent developments in different paradigms in theoretical and
empirical research on conditionals. It featured qualitative and
quantitative approaches to conditionals, exploring their differ-
ences and similarities from philosophical, formal, and empiri-
cal viewpoints. The major issues of debate were the “Equation”
and truth-conditionality, trivalence, connexivity, causality, in-
ferentialism, and coherence-based probability. This workshop
was co-supported by the projects Reasoning With Condition-
als in a Qualitative Cognitive Framework (DFG Project Nr.
272903199) as well as Logic and Philosophy of Science of Rea-
soning under Uncertainty (BMBF Project Nr. 01UL1906X).
Dorothy Edgington (Birkbeck College, University of Lon-
don) pointed out that probabilities also apply to counterfactual
conditionals without there being any fact of the matter. Build-
ing on Richard Bradley, who suggested representing condition-
als by ordered pairs of worlds and assigned truth conditions in
a way that validates the “Equation”, Edgington showed how to
assess conditionals with false antecedents probabilistically and
assign them truth-conditions, even if their truth value is inde-
terminate. In Edgington’s account, probability comes out as
probability of truth, truth-functional embeddings are available,
and validity can be preserved as necessary preservation of truth.
Mario Günther (ANU) proposed a unified theory of condition-
als, where the probability P(A C) of the Lewis conditional
is equal to the general image PA(C) on A of C. The probability
that a Lewis conditional is true is thus equal to the probabil-
ity that its consequent is true under the supposition of its an-
tecedent. Günther has shown that one subtype of general imag-
ing mimics Bayesian conditionalization. This explains why the
‘Equation’ is intuitive for certain conditionals while it does not
hold in general. Notably, the probability of counterfactuals is
well defined on his theory because the general image is defined
even if the probability of the antecedent is zero.
Hans Rott (University of Regensburg) introduced a “relevan-
tised” version of the Ramsey Test for conditionals in the con-
text of the classical theory of belief revision. The antecedent
is relevant to the consequent in the following sense: a condi-
tional is accepted just in case (i) the consequent is accepted if
the belief state is revised by the antecedent and (ii) the conse-
quent fails to be accepted if the belief state is revised by the
negated antecedent. Rott showed that the “difference-making
conditional” thus defined violates almost all of the traditional
principles of conditional logic, but that it obeys an interesting
logic of its own.
Paul Egré (CNRS/ENS, PSL University Paris; joint work with
Lorenzo Rossi & Jan Sprenger) discussed Allan Gibbard’s re-
sult that if a conditional operator satisfies the Law of Import-
Export, is supraclassical, and stronger than the material con-
ditional, it must collapse to the material conditional. This
leads into a dilemma for truth-functional accounts of indica-
tive conditionals: give up Import-Export, or embrace the two-
valued analysis. Egré et al. demonstrated how Import-Export
and truth-functionality can co-exist in trivalent logics. For the
Cooper-Cantwell conditional, collapse is prevented. Even if the
collapse occurs, the indicative and material conditional fail to
be intersubstitutable (de Finetti-Reichenbach conditional), un-
dermining Gibbard’s triviality result. The second day of the
workshop started with an emphasis on psychological applica-
tions.
Hitoshi Omori (Ruhr-University Bochum) gave an overview on
connexive systems, focusing on ways in which conditionals are
negated in these systems. For example, he showed how Wans-
ing’s connexive logics C and his three-valued paraconsistent
CLuNs are well behaved and compatible with a wide range of
indicative conditionals. Omori demonstrated that Cantwell’s
logic of conditional negation CN, interpreted in a Dunn seman-
tics, possesses connexive properties and also mentioned that
Stalnaker’s conditional logic satisfies connexive principles.
Nicole Cruz (UNSW; joint work with David Over) levelled crit-
icism at accounts that have argued for the importance of an in-
ferential relation between antecedent and consequent based on
missing-link conditionals at the expense of the widely endorsed
probability conditional. Cruz raised logical, conceptual, and
empirical challenges for inferentialism and cited examples for
pragmatically sound “non-interference conditionals” and “re-
ductio conditionals” that lend no support to inferentialism.
Shira Elqayam (De Montfort University; joint work with Igor
Douven and Patricia Mirabile) provided evidence in favour
of the Hypothetical Inferential Theory, which proposes that
individuals evaluate conditionals by heuristically gauging the
strength of the inferential connection from antecedent to con-
sequent rather than by conditional probability. Elqayam et al.
experimentally pitted their inferentialist interpretation of the
Ramsey Test against their main competitor, the suppositional
account. With everyday causal conditionals, Elqayam reported
inference strength to be a strong predictor for the probability
of conditionals relative to conditional probability or ∆p. They
report similar results for negative inference, missing link, and
positive inference conditionals.
Building on the work of Judea Pearl, Niels Skovgaard-Olsen
(Georg-August-Universität Göttingen) tested in a series of ex-
periments the hypothesis that causal relations require multiple
conceptual dimensions (prediction, intervention, counterfactual
dependence), which are diff erently encoded in indicative and
counterfactual conditionals. Results supported the idea that the
acceptance of indicative and counterfactual conditionals can
come apart and that the acceptance of both is needed for ac-
cepting causal relations. These results were interpreted in light
of recent debates in the psychology of reasoning concerning the
Relevance Effect on conditionals.
Departing from Ryle’s original suggestion that inferences ap-
ply conditionals, Christoph Michel (University of Regensburg)
introduced a conception of indicative conditionals as inference
tickets. Inference tickets restore consistency for belief states
that fail to cohere with the validity of the ticket. A valid infer-
ence ticket implies the truth of a contextually strict conditional
as well as a specific doxastic preference. Michel showed why
inference tickets provide an intuitive and parsimonious quali-
tative rationalisation of the asymmetry between Modus Ponens
and Modus Tollens.
Giuseppe Sanfilippo (University of Palermo) analysed com-
pounds of conditionals and iterated conditionals in the set-
ting of coherence. Specifically, he illustrated how to over-
come Lewis’s Triviality results and discussed logical opera-
tions among conditional events in terms of conditional random
quantities. Various results include how to recover nonmono-
tonicity, De Morgan’s Law, making latent information explicit,
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why the Fréchet-Hoeffding properties of conjunctions of condi-
tionals are preserved, and how p-consistency and p-entailment
are characterised within coherence. Finally, he discussed the
relations of independence and uncorrelation between random
quantities.
Niki Pfeifer (University of Regensburg) presented a unified
framework for investigating Aristotelian syllogisms and con-
nexive principles within the coherence approach to probability.
The validity of all Aristotelian syllogisms and selected connex-
ive principles can be recovered within the quantitative frame-
work of coherence. Pfeifer built bridges from Aristotle’s logi-
cal thinking on how to negate conditionals and on how to draw
inferences to nonmonotonic reasoning and generalised quanti-
fiers. We look forward to future collaborations among experts
of qualitative and quantitative approaches to reasoning about
conditionals and uncertainty.
ChristophMichel
Regensburg, Philosophy
Niki Pfeifer
Regensburg, Philosophy
Hans Rott
Regensburg, Philosophy
Calls for Papers
Pursuitworthiness in Scientific Inquiry: special issue of Stud-
ies of History and Philosophy of Science, Part A, deadline 1
May.
Classic Methodologies in the Philosophy of Science: special
issue of Journal for General Philosophy of Science, deadline
30 April.
What’s Hot in . . .
Science Policy
A common language of science
facilitates the exchange of ideas
and results, their replication, appli-
cation, and further development.
There are undoubtedly many ad-
vantages of using a lingua franca
in science. The ideal of having sci-
entific findings available to every-
one requires using a common lan-
guage. On the other hand, researchers report that it would
be easier for them to publish in their own language and that
they often feel frustrated with their knowledge of the lingua
franca (e.g., Tardy, Journal of English for academic purposes.
2004; 3:247-269). Moreover, learning a foreign language takes
a significant amount of time and in most cases also requires
considerable financial investments. The effort is also unequally
divided, as difficulties in learning a lingua franca also depend
on how similar it is to the mother tongue or other languages the
person speaks.
We should always keep in mind that the lingua franca of sci-
ence is arbitrarily chosen, i.e., based on non-epistemic factors,
and that the background also plays an important role in which
someone will adopt it. As some researchers are in this sense
disadvantaged, it is valuable to promote equity measures such
as free lector services in scientific journals, translations of im-
portant findings, and simultaneous translation at big scientific
events.
Even from the purely epistemic perspective, it is beneficial
to practice linguistic tolerance and promote linguistic plural-
ism in science. If academics with less linguistic competence
get excluded from the scientific discourse, their findings might
be lost. Linguistic tolerance means showing understanding to-
wards non-native speakers both when it comes to their written
and oral abilities, while linguistic pluralism stands for support-
ing and preserving communication and discoveries in diverse
languages.
Researchers that are insecure in their foreign language skills
might feel uncomfortable to present their results at conferences,
hesitant to participate in discussions, or even to publish. In
this way, some parts of the scientific community might lose or
be slower with catching up with the contributions of these re-
searchers. Moreover, their results might not be taken with equal
consideration because of their language proficiency – a phe-
nomenon called linguistic epistemic injustice (Peled, Bioethics.
2018; 32:360-367). International funding agencies evaluate
proposals written in the lingua franca, thus, to avoid linguis-
tic epistemic injustice, referees should also practice linguistic
tolerance.
Linguistic pluralism in science, on the other hand, is related
to the idea that some discoveries are language-dependent. Such
discoveries are often associated with linguistics and anthropol-
ogy; however, even in philosophy, it makes sense to ask oneself
whether the emergence of some theories was at least facilitated
through the language. For instance, Plato formulated his fa-
mous theory of ideas in Old Greek – a language that has in-
definite articles and in which it is possible to refer to an object
in general. It is a legitimate question whether it would be sig-
nificantly more difficult to propose such a theory (exclusively)
using a language that does not have articles, such as Latin. In
this type of language, one does not refer to an abstract general
entity, but only to the instantiations of an object.
In order to epistemically benefit from linguistic pluralism
in science, researchers who speak more than one language are
valuable as they can act as mitigating agents and share the re-
sults and ideas that would otherwise remain inaccessible for the
rest of the community. In this light, we can remember the Latin
proverb Quot linguas calles tot homines vales [How many lan-
guages you speak, that many people you are worth]. In our
context, researchers who can speak more than one language are
valuable for the scientific community, since they can bridge the
language barrier while keeping the epistemic benefits of lin-
guistic pluralism in science.
Vlasta Sikimić
University of Tübingen
Uncertain Reasoning
Ordinary people encounter many new things as they go through
life. Recently I learned about that distinctive Swedish item of
cutlery, the smörkniv – a smooth wooden “knife” used exclu-
sively for butter. After reading a Karolinska Institute report, I
learned that Covid-19 sufferers may develop two distinct kinds
of immunity: in addition to antibodies, which I was familiar
with, they may develop T-cell immunity.
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In different ways, these expe-
riences led me to form new be-
liefs. The fact that Swedes use
elegant juniper wood implements
for spreading butter is a prosaic
proposition that I had simply never
encountered before. In the med-
ical case, I learned new concepts
and some elements of a new (to
me) scientific theory concerning
human immunity. It is a strange failing of our formal models
of belief that they have little to say about this kind of learning.
Consider “Bayesian” models of belief, those that represent be-
liefs with probabilities and insist that learning is accomplished
by conditionalization. In these models, all resolutions of un-
certainty take place by updating pre-existing beliefs. Agents
must have priors for propositions to learn about them at later
stages. In this way, Bayesianism leaves no room for agents to
learn about genuinely new states of affairs and has no guidance
for real agents when they undergo such changes of awareness.
It also conflates two different kinds of uncertainty, and the cor-
responding ways of resolving them. The first is when an agent
is aware of a set of possible outcomes but does not know which
is the case. A common example is drawing playing card from
a standard 52 card deck. The agent’s uncertainty about which
card it will be is resolved by observing which of the 52 known
possibilities is the case.
The second kind is when an agent is unaware of the rele-
vant possibilities and becomes aware of them for the first time,
while possibly also learning which of them is the case. Sup-
pose that I show you an unfamiliar deck of cards and tell you
that it is a 60-card tournament deck of the Beta series of Magic:
The Gathering. I’ll assume most of you don’t know what that
is and ask you to consider your credences about the cards I will
draw from the deck. Presumably, you have no idea what to ex-
pect. You don’t know what MTG cards look like, what kinds
there are, what a playing deck usually consists of, and so on.
What you learn when I show you the first card is completely
unlike what happens in the playing card case This kind of un-
certainty, which I will call “unawareness”, and its resolution,
“awareness growth”, are the subject of a small but fascinating
literature in philosophy and economics. This is related to a
rather larger literature in logic and computer science about the
logic of unawareness and the revision of qualitative beliefs due
to awareness growth. I want to touch on a few developments in
the probabilistic literature.
What principles of rationality constraint an agent’s beliefs
across awareness changes? The economists Edi Karni and
Marie-Louise Vierø have derived a constraint for growths of
awareness axiomatically (‘“Reverse Bayesianism”: A Choice-
Based Theory of Growing Awareness’. American Economic
Review 103:7, 2013, and ‘Awareness of Unawareness: A The-
ory of Decision Making in the Face of Ignorance’. Journal
of Economic Theory 168, 2017). Roughly, their result is that
the ratio of probabilities of states should be preserved across
awareness changes. A state is a maximally specific possibility
for the agent, and I’m referring here to states which the agent
was previously aware of and assigned non-zero credence to.
Suppose you receive a bunch of flowers, and you think that one
of two friends is equally likely to have sent it. You later realise
a third person might have done so. Karni and Vierø’s principle
requires that you still think the first two friends equally likely
to be the sender. Richard Bradley endorses a principle similar
to “Reverse Bayesianism” in his recent book, Decision The-
ory with a Human Face (2017, Cambridge University Press).
Bradley provides a framework not just for belief change but
also for preference change due to awareness growth, and for
belief and preference changes due to awareness contractions,
brought about by shifting attention or forgetting.
Anna Mahtani challenges Karni, Vierø and Bradley in a 2020
paper in Synthese “Awareness Growth and Dispositional Atti-
tudes”. Mahtani’s challenge concerns how we identify proposi-
tions across the awareness change. She presents cases in which
a proposition can be described in two ways before the change,
and which splits into two distinct propositions after the change.
This presents a challenge to Reverse Bayesianism because we
can apply the principle in different ways and generate inconsis-
tent constraints for the agent’s posterior credences. In assuming
that the “same proposition” appears unambiguously in the do-
main of the old and new probabilities, Reverse Bayesianism has
left something out.
A second question concerns what to do when you expect
your awareness to grow. In a forthcoming book, Katie Steele
and Orri Stefánsson defend a reflection principle for aware-
ness, which they justify via a Dutch Book argument (Beyond
Uncertainty. Cambridge University Press). There should be
there should be no expected change of credence after aware-
ness growth, where the expectation is based entirely on the
agent’s prediction about their future epistemic state. As Steele
and Stefánsson say, this is a powerful constraint on decision-
making under extreme uncertainty
Joe Roussos
Institute for Futures Studies, Stockholm
Events
HE: Historical Epistemology, virtual, November 4, 12, 18, 25.
PotS: Philosophy of the Senses: Seeing, virtual, 13 November.
d.whiting@soton.ac.uk: H-OE, Higher-Order Evidence On-
line Workshop, virtual.25 January
Courses and Programmes
Courses
Programmes
MA in Reasoning, Analysis andModelling: University of Mi-
lan, Italy.
APhil: MA/PhD in Analytic Philosophy, University of
Barcelona.
Master Programme: MA in Pure and Applied Logic, Univer-
sity of Barcelona.
Doctoral Programme in Philosophy: Language, Mind and
Practice, Department of Philosophy, University of Zurich,
Switzerland.
Doctoral Programme in Philosophy: Department of Philoso-
phy, University of Milan, Italy.
LogiCS: Joint doctoral program on Logical Methods in Com-
puter Science, TU Wien, TU Graz, and JKU Linz, Austria.
HPSM: MA in the History and Philosophy of Science and
Medicine, Durham University.
Master Programme: in Statistics, University College Dublin.
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LoPhiSC: Master in Logic, Philosophy of Science and Epis-
temology, Pantheon-Sorbonne University (Paris 1) and Paris-
Sorbonne University (Paris 4).
Master Programme: in Artificial Intelligence, Radboud Uni-
versity Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
Master Programme: Philosophy and Economics, Institute of
Philosophy, University of Bayreuth.
MA in Cognitive Science: School of Politics, International
Studies and Philosophy, Queen’s University Belfast.
MA in Logic and the Philosophy ofMathematics: Department
of Philosophy, University of Bristol.
MA Programmes: in Philosophy of Science, University of
Leeds.
MA in Logic and Philosophy of Science: Faculty of Philosophy,
Philosophy of Science and Study of Religion, LMU Munich.
MA in Logic and Theory of Science: Department of Logic of
the Eotvos Lorand University, Budapest, Hungary.
MA in Metaphysics, Language, and Mind: Department of Phi-
losophy, University of Liverpool.
MA inMind, Brain and Learning: Westminster Institute of Ed-
ucation, Oxford Brookes University.
MA in Philosophy: by research, Tilburg University.
MA in Philosophy, Science and Society: TiLPS, Tilburg Uni-
versity.
MA in Philosophy of Biological and Cognitive Sciences: De-
partment of Philosophy, University of Bristol.
MA in Rhetoric: School of Journalism, Media and Communi-
cation, University of Central Lancashire.
MA programmes: in Philosophy of Language and Linguistics,
and Philosophy of Mind and Psychology, University of Birm-
ingham.
MRes in Methods and Practices of Philosophical Research:
Northern Institute of Philosophy, University of Aberdeen.
MSc in Applied Statistics: Department of Economics, Mathe-
matics and Statistics, Birkbeck, University of London.
MSc in Applied Statistics and Datamining: School of Mathe-
matics and Statistics, University of St Andrews.
MSc in Artificial Intelligence: Faculty of Engineering, Uni-
versity of Leeds.
MSc in Cognitive& Decision Sciences: Psychology, University
College London.
MSc in Cognitive Systems: Language, Learning, and Reason-
ing, University of Potsdam.
MSc in Cognitive Science: University of Osnabrück, Germany.
MSc in Cognitive Psychology/Neuropsychology: School of
Psychology, University of Kent.
MSc in Logic: Institute for Logic, Language and Computation,
University of Amsterdam.
MSc in Mind, Language & Embodied Cognition: School of
Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences, University of
Edinburgh.
MSc in Philosophy of Science, Technology and Society: Uni-
versity of Twente, The Netherlands.
MRes in Cognitive Science and Humanities: Language, Com-
munication and Organization: Institute for Logic, Cognition,
Language, and Information, University of the Basque Country
(Donostia San Sebastián).
OpenMind: International School of Advanced Studies in Cog-
nitive Sciences, University of Bucharest.
ResearchMaster in Philosophy and Economics: Erasmus Uni-
versity Rotterdam, The Netherlands.
Jobs and Studentships
Studentships
Doctoral Programme in Philosophy: Language, Mind and
Practice, Department of Philosophy, University of Zurich,
Switzerland.
LogiCS: Joint doctoral program on Logical Methods in Com-
puter Science, TU Wien, TU Graz, and JKU Linz, Austria.
Jobs
Post doc: in Inferences Under Severe Uncertainties, University
of Technology of Compiégne, open until filled.
Post doc: in Models, Uncertainty, and Rational Decisions,
deadline 9 November.
Post doc: in Logic (uncertain reasoning), deadline 16 Novem-
ber.
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